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FORCES IN NORTH QUEENSLAND POLITICS, 1914-1929 
Mr. D.W. Hunt 
I have taken only a fairly short period in order to illustrate some 
of the prominent features of politics in the north. In doing so, I hope 
to propose some hypotheses about the nature of electoral behaviour in 
North Queensland. Naturally, any conclusions are only valid for this 
period, but I believe some interesting comparisons with the present polit-
ical scene can quite readily Be drawn. 
The interesting aspect of politics in the north at this time was the 
apparent contrast between the voting pattern in state elections and that in 
federal elections. It is this contrast in electoral behaviour which I now 
want to investigate. 
In the nine state electorates which then comprised North Queensland, 
the non-Labor parties were consistently successful in only one - the 
cattle grazing and sugar-growing district of Mirani, near Mackay. The 
other electorates - from Cook in Cape York to Mackay, were generally, and 
correctly, regarded as safe Labor strongholds. The main reason for this 
was simply the nature of economic activity in the north, and the corres-
pondingly large working-class. Pastoral, mining, and sugar workers com-
bined with industrial and transport workers of the towns to give a solid 
base to Labor's electoral strength. 
The federal electorate of Herbert then included all of coastal North 
Queensland from Sarina north to the Torres Strait; it is therefore a very 
convenient area for any study of politics in the region. The federal 
political situation in Herbert up to 1916 was virtually the same as the 
state scene. A Labor publican and journalist by the name of Fred Bamford 
won the seat narrowly in 1901, but subsequently improved this hold, gaining 
64% of the vote in 1914. Thus Herbert seemed to be a blue-ribbon Labor 
electorate. 
I have been unable to find out very much about Bamford. Unlike many 
politicians, he was never given much to talking about his past; he left 
no personal papers and apparently severed all his connections with North 
Queensland after his retirement in 1925. He was born in outback New South 
Wales in 1849, and subsequently lived in Toowoomba, where he learnt 
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carpentry, Bamford came to North Queensland in the early 1880s as a 
railway inspector of bridges. He settled in Bowen, where he ran both 
the Railway Hotel and a short-lived newspaper. He was elected to the 
town council and became Mayor of Bowen in 1898. After two unsuccessful 
tries at winning the state seat of Bowen, the prospect of a federated 
Commonwealth parliament gave Fred Bamford his chance. He was endorsed 
as Labor candidate for Herbert in the first federal elections, in 1901. 
Bamford's campaign was fought virtually on a single issue: coloured 
versus white labour on the sugar fields, and he presented himself as' 
a "White Australia" advocate, establishing a precedent for later 
elections. Racial prejudice and fears of alien economic competition 
formed the basis of the labour movement's political catchcry of "V/hite 
Australia", which in North Queensland meant abolition of kanaka labour 
and repatriation of the kanakas to their Melanesian homes. This catch-
cry struck a responsive chord among most North Queenslanders, and, 
as a result, Bamford was returned. 
Bamford's main political beliefs expressed the prevailing tenets 
of Australian nationalism. His ardent patriotism, which came to the 
fore during the first world war, was combined with a strong sense of 
British imperial loyalty, for Bamford, along with other Labor politicians, 
was convinced that Australian safety was founded on British protection. 
This sense of imperial nationalism transcended Bamford's other political 
ideals and led to his eventual expulsion from the Labor Party in 1916 
when the great debate over conscription for overseas military service 
split the Labor Party. Bamford was amongst those expelled for suppor-
ting conscription. This rejection by his traditional political backers 
could be expected to spell electoral doom in such a firm Labor area as 
North Queensland. However, as a non-Labor, that is, Nationalist Party 
man, Bamford continued to win in Herbert - much to the consternation of 
the ALP and the bewilderment of many political observers. Even Bamford's 
retirement did not mean the return of Labor to its previous dominance of 
the Herbert federal electorate. The elections of 1925 saw the Labor 
Premier of Queensland, E.G. Theodore, defeated in Herbert by a local 
doctor from Mackay. The Nationalist Party's success in the north came 
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to an end only in 1928, when Labor re-gained Herbert, holding it unbroken 
for thirty years. This picture seems to suggest that the federal elec-
tions of 1917, 1919, 1922 and 1925, when the Nationalists won Herbert, 
were but temporary deviations from a North Queensland Labor norm. 
Thus North Queenslanders returned non-Labor members to federal 
parliament in four successive elections, while at the same time they 
voted fairly solidly for Labor at the state level. Why then, was there 
this 10 year Nationalist interlude in a traditionally safe Labor area? 
This question can be answered firstly by a look at the various state-wide 
and Australla-wide political factors which affected the north; and secondly, 
by isolating local political factors which were, perhaps, peculiar to North 
Queensland. 
Electoral behaviour in the north was in most respects typical of that 
in other Queensland and Australian electorates. Issues were very often the 
same as those raised in the south; speeches by national political figures 
often took precedence in the press over the local election campaign. 
Newspaper front-page headlines during elections invariably told of happen-
ings in Brisbane, Sydney, or Melbourne; the local campaign was reported in 
the middle pages. Further, it can be assumed that voters in North Queens-
land voted the way they did for reasons similar to those of voters through-
out Australia. Therefore, if national and state-wide trends and issues 
can explain the North Queensland voting pattern to a significant extent, 
perhaps the first factor that should be looked at is the relative strength 
of the state and federal political parties. 
Strange as it may seem today, the Queensland branch of the ALP was, 
in days bygone, a very strong and vital organisation, combining a pro-
gressive image and talented leaders with a reformist program geared to 
the needs and wishes of the vast majority of electors. In 1915 Labor 
gained the state government benches in a landslide election in which they 
won 45 of the 72 seats. They remained in office untilthe DLP rupture of 
the '50s, save only for a few years of Tory rule, which occurred, unfor-
tunately for the non-Labor forces, during the great Depression. Impressive 
advances in social welfare and successful agricultural re-organisation 
following Labor's advent to power had established a firm base of support 
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for Labor as a moderate, reformist and petty bourgeois, "small-man's" 
government. Although there were increasing signs of bitter internal 
feuds within the labour movement, and of dissatisfaction with Labor's 
alleged administrative extravagance, it was not until the late '20s when 
these reached the stage of threatening electoral success. 
The non-Labor political parties in North Queensland, in contrast 
with the efficient Labor organisations, were often disorganised and both 
financially and numerically weak. However, after the issue of conscrip-
tion split the Labor Party, the non-Labor forces received an injection of 
enthusiasm. Moves towards better organisation resulted in the formation 
of the Northern Country. Party in 1920. Yet despite strong campaigns, 
and despite the backing of the conservative press, they failed to achieve 
much success in state politics. 
So much for the overall state scene as a contributing factor in North 
Queensland politics. Let's now turn to the federal scene. The success of 
state Labor was not matched in federal politics. Labor gained office in 
1914 on their leader's promise that Australia would support the Allied 
cause in the war to the "last man and the last shilling." It seemed, 
momentarily, that Labor's position in federal, as well as state politics, 
was unassailable, and that Labor was, indeed, as its supporters claimed, 
the "natural" government for Australia. On the other hand, the tensions 
of an alarming rate of unemployment, rising prices and disagreement about 
Australia's degree of commitment in the war were soon to prove portents 
of a decline in Labor's federal fortunes. The virulence of the conscrip-
tion referenda campaigns of 1916-1917 drove a wedge not only into the 
Labor Party, resulting in their defeat, but also into Australian society 
as a whole, embittering political life for years. 
In federal parliament, Bamford was quickly identified as a staunch 
advocate of conscription. In fact, he was the first MHR to urge con-
scription - a somewhat dubious distinction of which he later boasted 
frequently. In July of 1915 Bamford made a speech charging both sides 
of the house with lack of courage; the voluntary system of recruitment 
had failed to provide enough soldiers, and, according to Bamford, the 
voluntary system was also unfair. "While many men have volunteered". 
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he said, "others, equally fit to serve have failed to come forward." 
Conscription would therefore eliminate both inefficiency and injustice. 
Such opinions show the proud, imperialist attitude to the war held 
by Bamford and some other Labor members. This group led by W.M. Hughes, 
wished to suspend Labor's domestic political program and concentrate on 
winning the war by whatever means possible. Like others in this group, 
Bamford was relatively older, had had several years parliamentary service, 
was Protestant, and had little trade union background. However, the mood 
of rank and file labour and a large part of the parliamentary party opposed 
conscription and the subordination of Labor's peace-time policy of social 
reform to the Allied war effort. A left-wing faction, influenced by the 
ideas and traditions of socialism, pacifism and Irish nationalism, was 
increasingly hostile to the war itself. 
Meanwhile, back in North Queensland, the protagonists of the con-
scription debate polarised along the lines of existing socio-political 
divisions. Unfortunately, lack of time prevents me from discussing the 
colourful upheavals and divisions which the question of conscription pro-
duced in North Queensland. Suffice it to say that the pattern throughout 
the north was very similar to the Townsville scene, which Michael Douman 
described in his article, ["Townsville During World War I", v. sup.]. I 
would like now to confine my remarks to the effects of these two bitter 
campaigns on the federal politics of northern voters; bearing in mind the 
question I posed initially regarding the contradictory voting pattern in 
state and federal elections during the war and early 1920s. 
The effect of the conscription issue in North Queensland can be 
summed up by saying that it destroyed Labor's secure hold on the Herbert 
electorate. The loss of Bamford to the nationalists was probably the 
biggest set-back to Labor's aspirations in federal politics in North 
Queensland. Labor's share of the vote declined sharply from its pre-
conscription level of about 60% to only 46 to 48% in the elections of 
1917, 1919 and 1922. The national split in the party had repercussions 
in the north. ALP branches were wracked by defections and demoralization. 
For example, the president of the Ingham branch campaigned extensively 
on behalf of the 'Yes' cause in the referenda, exhorting "all true labour 
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men to heed the advice of Freddy Bamford, the grand old veteran of Labor." 
Thus the chaos wrought in North Queensland by the Labor split was 
a major factor in Bamford's win, now as a Nationalist, in the 1917 federal 
elections. Three fairly distinct groups of voters supported Fred Bamford 
after his change of party. Most obvious were the committ-ed Liberal or anti-
Labor voters, who accepted him with few misgivings, because although he 
may once have been a Laborite, he was now the anti-Labor candidate. 
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, there was a section of regular 
Labor supporters who continued voting for Bamford because of the attrac-
tion of his personality, or because they agreed with his views. Finally, 
there were the uncommitted, or "swinging" voters, who shied away from the 
manifest weakness of the Labor Party. 
The reaction of uncommitted voters to Labor's federal weakness was a 
feature of the Australia-wide decline in Labor support. The loss of most 
of its federal leaders left the ALP with a lack-lustre leadership whose 
search for a viable alternative policy was too often plagued by internal 
divisions. The demoralisation of federal Labor was clearly apparent in 
North Queensland. Few people could disagree with the Townsville Bulletin 
when it argued during the 1922 election: 
even supposing the sugar growers of North Queensland were sufficiently 
deluded to accept the assurances of Labor Codlins, what is there to 
be gained by supporting such a hopelessly discredited hotch-potch.... 
The Labor Party, federally, is down and out. 
Or when the same paper commented with satisfaction when the result - a 
Nationalist victory - was known: 
The defection of Mr. Hughes and those who went with him was a 
stunning blow, from which Labor has never recovered. 
Although the Labor Party was unsuccessful in the federal arena after 
Bamford's defection, the state electorates of North Queensland remained 
Labor strongholds. In the post-war years the federal party was weak and 
ineffectual, but state Labor remained efficient and successful. The 
conscription split decimated the federal parliamentary party, but it did 
not affect the political fortunes of the state party, from which there 
were few defections. In fact, Ryan and Theodore, the party leaders, had 
gained in stature from a conflict between state and federal authorities 
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over conscription and war censorship. 
So. the contrasting voting pattern in state and federal politics in 
North Queensland, was, I would suggest, both a cause and a symptom of the 
relative strength of state and federal political parties. Having looked 
at this, I want now to elaborate a little on some of the Australia-wide 
issues which contributed to Labor's electoral disfavour on the federal 
scene, and to point out how such issues were reflected in the north. 
One aspect of Fred Bamford's electoral appeal, both as a Labor man 
and a non-Labor representative, was his ardent nationalism. Although he 
had opposed the Boer War, Bamford fell in with the trend of Labor Party 
policy - before World War I, - towards support for compulsory military 
service and the formation of Australian defence forces. In all election 
campaigns he also stressed his vigorous support for the White Australia 
policy - which was an inseparable component of Australian nationalism. 
By the time of the great war, Bamford was a proud and outspoken Empire 
loyalist. To the people of North Queensland, he contrasted himself after 
1916 as an "Empire Nationalist" with the allegedly unpatriotic Labor 
Party. 
Many historians have described how Labor's success before the war was 
attributable partly to the fundamental sentiments of Australian nationalism 
which the ALP embodied and expressed. This nationalism had developed from 
a sometimes republican anti-imperialism in the 1890s, to a much less stri-
dent and exclusive patriotism, which most people felt was compatible with 
continued membership of the British Bnpire. 
During the course of the war, nationalism, previously linked with 
the political Left, was harnessed by the conservative classes, changing 
character subtly once again to become even more oriented towards Empire 
and more closely identified with the pride of race of the Protestant 
middle class. The sentiments which Bamford expressed exemplify this 
shift in Australian nationalism from Labor to non-Labor between 1901 and 
1918. 
Declining support for Labor in Herbert thus reflected a widespread 
belief that Labor was no longer the party of Australian nationalism. 
Certainly the ALP recognised that one explanation for their failure was 
the popular appeal of Bamford's patriotic and chauvinist declamations. 
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The Labor candidate for Herbert in 1922, one Mossy Hynes, acknowledged 
this when he expressed the hope that: 
As the jingo madness subsided...the position would alter largely, 
and the men and women in Herbert [would] exercise their votes with 
more intelligence and a greater measure of class consciousness. 
The swing of Australian nationalism from Left to Right was also 
linked with a trend in the labour movement towards a more doctrinaire 
socialist outlook. Conditions in Australia after the war were conducive 
to the spread of more revolutionary notions amongst the trade unions. 
Declining confidence in the efficiency of political action facilitated 
the spread of the beliefs of the anarcho-syndicalist I.W.W. and the 
Communist Party. Now, as some trade unions became more influenced by 
syndicalism and communism, so the electoral image of the ALP appeared 
to take an ideological turn to the Left, despite the efforts of moderate 
politicians to keep the party on a fixed and stable course. This unfav-
ourable image accounts for the success with which non-Labor was able to 
attack Labor for its war record and supposed communist influences. 
In North Queensland, frequent strikes lent especial virulence to 
the raising of the Red bogey. Editorials in the daily press reminded 
electors that "the communist has gradually under-mined the power of those 
Labor leaders who were shy of revolutionary doctrines." Articles like one 
leader in the Mackay Mercury abounded: headlined "Bolshie on the Back 
Seat", it charged that bolshevism had been occupying the back seat of the 
Labor vehicle since the war, and that, "if the industrial history of 
Australia during the past few years counts for anything, the reins already 
are in the hands of the Communists, and whether they are to remain there 
will depend solely on the decision of the electors next month." Some 
Nationalist Party officials hinted at "bloody revolution" should Labor win 
control of federal parliament. Another, perhaps carried away by his own 
rhetoric, declared the small town of Babinda to be the "heart of Bolshevism 
in the north." 
The allegation of communist saturation of the labour movement re-
bounded more on the federal Labor Party than on the state. It was hard 
for the non-Labor forces to credibly accuse the state government of social-
ist tendencies. Not only was the so-called socialism of the Labor govern-
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ment confined to piece-meal state enterprises and co-operative marketing 
which fell far short of beginning to approach nationalisation, but the 
leaders of the state ALP, Theodore and McCormack, showed a predisposition 
to castigate "communists" almost as indiscriminately as conservative 
politicians. Remarks Theodore made about "booting out direct actionists" 
and his denunciation of the insidious influence of "the revolutionary, 
direct-action and sabotage minority", could well have been said by a non-
Labor politician, rather than the titular head of the Queensland labour 
movement. 
So much for the Australia-wide and Queensland-wide issues influencing 
northern politics. Now, to go further towards finding out why North 
Queenslanders voted for Labor in the State, but anti-Labor in the federal 
sphere, we must investigate those political factors peculiar to North 
Queensland. 
One of the most striking of the local features was the importance of 
the sugar industry and of the welfare of sugar farmers. The development 
of North Queensland was due largely to the success with which sugar cane 
was cultivated in the fertile river valleys. Not only was the economy of 
the region based almost entirely on sugar and ancillary industries, but the 
sugar industry was also seen universally as a bulwark of that cherished 
national ideal, the White Australia policy. 
A Royal Commission into the industry in 1912 well exemplifies this 
feeling. It concluded that: 
Unsettled areas of the tropical parts of Australia are not only a 
source of strategic weakness. They constitute a positive temptation 
to Asiatic invasion; and may give to the White Australia policy a 
complexion which must inevitably weaken the claims of Australia to 
external support.... the ultimate, and in our opinion effective 
justification of the protection of the Sugar Industry lies beyond 
questions of industry or wealth production. It must be sought in 
the very existence of Australia as a nation. 
Because the sugar industry depended on government subsidy and tariff 
protection for its prosperity, if not for its survival, all political parties 
competed to win the vote of the cane grower, sometimes with very extravagant 
promises. Moreover, the non-Labor parties could not then rely comfortably 
on the support of the farmers. They were a politically alert group whose 
allegiances could swing either way. 
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On the federal level, it was the Nationalist Party after 1917 which 
was more successful in convincing sugar farmers that it was the only party 
genuinely sympathetic to the industry. Before the conscription crisis, 
and the ALP split, voting returns show that many sugar districts of North 
Queensland voted Labor. However, when the Hughes group left the party and 
the Nationalist Party was formed, the sugar areas changed their allegiance 
accordingly. The key to this change is in the system of sugar marketing 
agreements between the state and federal governments, under which the 
Commonwealth of Australia controlled both the retail price of refined 
sugar and the price paid to growers and millers. This sugar agreement 
was generally regarded as the foundation of stability in the industry, 
as the federal government's control was used to maintstin a profitable price 
for the producer, rather than to keep prices down for the consumer. Hughes' 
Labor government had initiated the system, and the Nationalist Party, still 
under Hughes, continued with it. The growers voted for the sugar agreement. 
Bamford himself was regarded as one of the chief instigators not only of 
the agreement itself but also of subsequent rises in the price of raw 
sugar. His successor as representative for Herbert, Dr. Lewis Nott, like-
wise presented himself as the "Sugar Farmer's Candidate." After his 
election in 1925, one newspaper gave as reason for his win, that "the 
dominating issue in North Queensland has always been the sugar question." 
The federal Labor Party never wholly escaped from the charge that 
it wanted cheaper sugar for the consumer. The Nationalist Party never 
stopped insisting that Labor was controlled by southern interests wanting 
cheap sugar. The presence of some prominent Labor politicians at a meeting 
of the Housewives' Association in Melbourne, where a resolution was carried 
demanding the end of the sugar agreement and a lower price for sugar, did 
nothing to refute such allegations. In southern states and metropolitan 
centres, a policy of lower prices was an undoubted electoral advantage, 
but in North Queensland, it was a millstone around Labor's neck. 
The political importance of sugar also helps explain contrasting 
state and federal voting patterns in North Queensland. Although in the 
sugar grower's mind the federal Labor Party was identified with southern 
consumer interests, the state Labor Party earned support for their 
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assiduous protection and encouragement of the sugar industry as a whole 
and the small farmers in particular. Legislation benefiting farmers was 
enacted soon after Labor's accession to power in 1915, and formed the 
basis of the industry's marketing structure for many years. The record 
of the state Labor Party in fostering a stable sugar industry, one 
occasionally conceded even by their opponents, provided the basis for 
strong rural support for Labor. Such support contrasted sharply with 
the poor showing of the federal party in rural areas of North Queensland. 
Another major feature of politics in the north was the radicalism 
of the labour movement. The largest and most powerful trade union was 
the A.W.U., a conservative mass union whose officials controlled the 
ALPs Queensland Executive for so long. A.Vi^ .U. officials likewise domina-
ted the Labor Party branches in the north, providing most of the region's 
parliamentarians. Professor Bolton writes that: 
It could almost have been said that an A.W.U. organiser carried a 
cabinet minister's portfolio in his tucker-box. In Theodore, Gillies, 
McCormack, and Forgan-Smith [all A.W.U. men], North Queensland pro-
vided Labor with four successive leaders, and Queensland with its 
premiers for all but 3 of the years between 1919 and 1942. [G.C. 
Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away, p. 335] 
The A.W.U. represented ALP orthodoxy in the north, but in contrast 
to this attitude was another tradition of labour political activity in 
North Queensland - a tradition of left-wing radicalism and direct-action 
militancy. Evidence of this tradition is not hard to find, and Bolton 
speculates that the sharp edge to northern radicalism was a particular 
product of North Queensland - the economic dependence of the region on 
the seasonal industries of meat and sugar, resultant economic insecurity 
among employees in such industries, and the tough, practical conditions 
of life in a frontier society, isolated socially and politically from the 
centres of authority in the south. Yet, in the absence of any detailed 
research on the labour movement in the north, the veracity of this radical 
tradition must remain uncertain. 
Be that as it may, the core of militant unionism from 1914 to 1929 
was in the railways, the meatworks, and on the waterfront. The A.R.U. led 
other militant unions in consistent and outspoken criticism of the state 
Labor government, spearheading a conflict between radicals and moderates 
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which ultimately divided Labor in Queensland, causing its downfall in 
1929. The post-war period saw a rash of strikes throughout Australia 
in response to spiralling prices and static wages. In the north, a series 
of particularly bitter strikes, often accompanied by violence, broke out. 
The most famous of these was the Townsville meatworkers' strike of 1919, 
hallowed in Townsville folk legend as "Bloody Sunday." 
The effects of working-class militancy on politics is not easy to 
discern. However, I would postulate that union militancy had two political 
effects, both of which were detrimental to Labor's election prospects. In 
the first place Labor lost the support of many unionists who became increas-
ingly disillusioned with the moderate reformism of the state Labor govern-
ment. This dissatisfaction was particularly evident when Theodore stood 
as federal candidate for Herbert. His rallies were often disrupted by 
disaffected militants. At Bowen and Innisfail Theodore was told to get 
out of the labour movement. Local watersiders also accused him of being 
a liar and a scab. 
However the evidence is far from conclusive that discontent within 
the ALP and militant hostility towards Theodore actually produced a vote 
for the non-Labor candidate. Internal dissension certainly weakened the 
party, but would the far Left have deserted lAbor to vote for the Right? 
In the absence of parties or candidates standing for a more radical 
ideology than that which Labor offered, working class voters would 
presumably have continued to vote Labor OR expressed their dissatisfaction 
by invalidating their vote. Indeed, a high percentage of informal votes 
in various Herbert elections suggests that this may well have been the 
case. 
Secondly, the frequency of strikes in the north undoubtedly produced 
a reaction against Labor among middle-class voters and also among many of 
the moderate working class majority, who normally voted Labor but who were 
swayed by so-called "Bolshevist extremism." Indeed the frequent strikes 
seemed almost perfectly timed to harm the ALPs federal candidates. In 1919 
Nationalists were able to point to incidents like "Bloody Sunday" as evi-
dence of the dangers of industrial militancy and left-wing tendencies in 
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the Labor Party, During the 1922 election campaign, a strike by Innisfail 
watersiders again provided fuel for the Nationalist attack on industrial 
unrest under Labor. In 1925 a state-wide railway strike had forced the 
capitulation of the government on the question of wage increases. And, 
a bare fortnight before polling day, violence broke out on the North 
Queensland waterfront, as farmers, determined to get their produce to 
southern markets, clashed with watersiders demanding a fairer system of 
employment. 
The strike arose when the Queensland shipping companies rejected a 
demand that the work of loading be equally distributed amongst all avail-
able labourers. After a few weeks, however, secret ballots showed that 
most watersiders favoured a return to work under the award conditions 
existing before the strike. Most branches thus resumed work, but the 
militants of Cairns and Bowen held out. Large consignments of sugar and 
timber soon piled up on the wharves, and primary producers became increas-
ingly antagonistic towards the strikers. The press reported that the 
Home Hill sugar farmers, who then used the port of Bowen, were desperate, 
and that there was a "general paralysis of trade and industry in Cairns 
and district." 
The confrontation finally exploded as the strike entered its ninth 
week. Over 600 cane farmers and timber cutters arrived in Cairns on a 
Sunday night with the avowed aim of restoring peace on the waterfront. 
Next day, the producers marched - in columns of four - to load the produce 
on the ships themselves. After a day of chaos and ugly incidents, the 
watersiders agreed to return to work. Farmers searched houses and ordered 
watersiders out to work; leading union officials were physically intimi-
dated and forced to resign (one being driven to the edge of town and told 
to "start walking"); while only police intervention prevented the lynching 
of a unionist who had rashly brandished a revolver. 
The way the newspapers of North Queensland saw this incident says 
much for the depth of class antagonisms aroused by industrial militancy. 
Under the heading, "the Rout of the Communists", the Cairns Post said: 
Monday, November the second, will be long remembered as a historic 
day in the annals of Cairns and North Queensland, when the primary 
producers of the Tableland and the sugar districts delivered a most 
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staggering blow to the Communist forces, who had sought to control 
the local watersiders and hold up the produce of this district... 
The events of the day demonstrated conclusively that the people 
of the North, which has too long been the happy hunting ground of 
the Communist pest, are determined to rid Cairns and district of 
it once and for all. 
In similar vein was the North Queensland Register. Describing the 
farmer's actions, it praised them in eulogistic terms, drawing an analogy 
between the situations in North Queensland and in Italy. Nothing that in 
Italy "socialism and industrial anarchy created the Fascist movement, who 
re-established a more peaceful state of affairs", it praised the farmers 
as "the Fascisti of North Queensland", who faced with repeated industrial 
hold-ups "and the pitiful failure to rule of the Queensland Government", 
admirably stepped in to restore peace and industry. The Advocate also 
saw the comparability of the two movements, though in a much less favour-
able light. 
The detrimental effect of strikes on Labor's political fortunes in 
the federal sphere was no less marked in the area of state politics. 
After the 1919 strikes, there was a severe state-wide decline in Labor 
support. The government's majority was reduced to one; in North Queensland 
the Labor members for Townsville and Kennedy were unseated by Northern 
Country Party candidates. The culminating effect of militant dissent 
in the labour movement came after the South Johnstone sugar worker s 
and railway's strike in 1927. The action of the Labor premier, McCormack, 
is dismissing the striking railwaymen, lost the Labor government the 
support of large numbers of its traditional supporters. As a result. 
Labor was ousted from the state benches in the next elections, in 1929. 
Finally, I must mention one very interesting aspect of North 
Queensland politics. That is-the apparent importance of personal 
popularity as an ingredient of political success. Scholars have suggested 
that North Queenslanders, convinced that those in authority in the distant 
southern governments cared little about them and less about their conditions, 
developed a strong conviction in their ability to look after themselves. 
This conviction manifested itself in a tendency to "choose a man irres-
pective of his political label," [G.C. Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away, 
p. 337] 
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Whether this is true, or whether it is only a myth, remains to be 
seen. But it seems anyway that North Queenslanders have produced a 
number of highly individual politicians whose success is indeed a 
reflection of their personal popularity. The case of Fred Patterson, 
who was the Communist member for Bowen in the late 1940s, is a famous 
example. In more recent years, the names of Tom Aikens and Duke Bonnett 
come readily to mind, 
A significant element in the success of non-Labor in Herbert federal 
elections was the personality of the Nationalist candidates. Both Bamford 
and Nott gained a significant personal vote from among those who normally 
voted Labor. In Bamford's case, many electors seemed to have formed 
a sentimental attachment to the man, which remained unbroken when he 
changed parties, Bamford was respected even by his political enemies. 
This is what the left-wing Labor politician Frank Anstey said about 
Bamford, when the latter retired from parliament in 1925: 
[He is] the most gentlemanly ts^ pe of individual that enters the 
public life of this country. He is one of those men, who amid 
divergence of opinion and in a great crisis, could choose without 
venom between his own convictions and the party with which he 
had been associated with for a lifetime...Whom can we respect 
more highly than a man who, when his conscience called him to 
separate from political friends, did it without showing hatred, 
hostility, or recrimination? 
Another Labor member, Dr, Maloney, declared: 
To me he epitomises what a French poet has put in the fewest of 
words - L'amitie c'est 1'amour sans ailes.,,I do not know any 
honourable member who has not a kindly word and a kindly thought 
for him whom we know as 'dear Freddy Bamford', 
Dr. Nott also proved to be a vivacious and energetic candidate, 
whose success was enhanced by the prevalence of working-class dissatis-
faction with his opponent, Theodore's biographer also considers the 
personal element in the 1925 election to be an important factor, [l. 
Young, Theodore - His Life and Times, p, 62] 
Another reason for the contrasting fortunes of Labor in state and 
federal politics seems to have been the popularity and ability of the 
state Labor members. Politicians like Jack Dash [Townsville], Charlie 
Collins [Bowen], Percy Pease [Innisfail] and Bill Forgan-Smith [Mackay] 
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were admired and respected men, with strong local member holds on their 
constituencies. Thus, while not wholly endorsing the emphasis placed 
on personality by some observers of the North Queensland political 
scene, I will suggest that North Queenslanders were perhaps less con-
cerned than other Australians about crossing party boundaries and 
renouncing traditional party allegiances. If they did not so much 
"choose a man irrespective of his label", as Bolton suggests, they did 
look at the man every bit as intently as at the label. 
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